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THE RISK OF EXTINCTION: A RISK 
ANALYSIS OF THE ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT AS CO:MPARED TO CITES 
DAVIDs. FAVRE':: 
INTRODUCTION 
Life for any individual is a series of risk assessments. The 
continued existence of a particular species depends on the sum 
total of the risks or rewards realized by the actions of each indi-
vidual member plus the sum total of the risks or rewards imposed 
upon that species by other species, together 'vith the unknowable 
acts of Nature. With the overwhelming and ubiquitous presence 
of human beings around the globe, the human species has the 
ability and interest to impose significant risks of destruction upon 
other species.1 Adverse ecological impacts are leveraged from 
technological advances and driven by forces of irresponsible cap-
italism.2 The money and interests of a thousand humans may be 
all that is needed to drive a beautiful bird species to extinction in 
the wild.3 Fmally, there is the human capacity to self-direct and 
* Professor David Favre teaches at the Detroit College of Law at l\1ichigan 
State University. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Michael 
Kelly who ably reviewed a draft of this Article. 
1 In an article discussing the devastation of coral reefs by dynamite and 
cyanide, it was noted that, "as in other developing countries, modem technol-
ogy has vastly increased the capacity to mine and destroy ecological systems for 
short-term gain even as poverty, corruption and a rapidly growing population 
have increased the pressures to do so." Rod? Reel? Dynamite, U.S. NEws & 
WoRLD REP., Nov. 25, 1996 at 56. SciENCE NEws reported that the North Sea 
cod stock could collapse from over fishing. An easy solution of using a larger 
mesh size net will not even be tried because of short-term economic greed and! 
or need of the fisherman. Janet Raloff, Overjislzing Imperils Cod Reprodllction, 
151 SCIENCE NEWS 124 (1997). 
2 "National and international economic policy has usually ignored the envi-
ronment .... [E]conomy-wide policy reforms designed to promote growth and 
liberalization have been encouraged with little regard to their environmental 
consequences .... " Kenneth Arrow et al., Economic Growth, Carrying Capac-
ity, and the Environment, 268 SCIENCE 520 (1995). 
3 As an example of the potential of one individual to impact a species, it has 
been estimated that Tony Silva, who illegally imported over 300 exotic birds, 
may be responsible for the removal of 5 to 10 percent of the world's population 
of hyacinth macaws. Holly Reed, TRAFFic USA, Dec. 1996, 15(4) at 7. Mr. 
Silva received a sentence of 82 months in prison from the federal courts, one of 
341 
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self-limit activities. Beyond the capacity to destroy, humans have 
the capacity to be aware of the consequences of their actions and 
to care about those consequences. In other words, humans usu~ 
ally can choose whether to impose risks on other species. 
The Endangered Species Act of the United States (ESA)4 
and the international Convention on International 1l"ade in En~ 
dangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)S are both 
political products of human beings seeking to control the risk of 
extinction imposed upon other species by human activity. The 
ESA is all-encompassing in that it seeks to deal with the threats 
of species endangerment from all sources. CITES seeks to deal 
only with one component of the basketful of risks humans im~ 
pose upon other species, which is that of international trade in 
animals and plants, be they alive or in parts. 6 Human law can 
approach the issues negatively, through criminal prohibitions, as 
well as positively, through adopting recovery plans. Both the 
ESA and CITES seek to reduce the risk of extinction for species 
around the world by listing those at risk and then imposing re-
strictions on their uses. The ESA, but not CITES, also tries to 
create positive support for the at-risk species. 
One consequence of reducing the risk for non~human spe-
cies through the provisions of the ESA and CITES is that some 
human actions must be limited or constrained. Preservation of 
endangered species in the political arena requires balancing the 
risk to the species with the degree of government interference 
with human activity. This Article first explains a risk analysis 
the longest jail sentences given in the U.S. for an endangered species violation. 
Exotic Bird Expert Sentenced for Parrot Smuggling, Reuters North American 
Wrre, Nov. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, News library, Curnws file. 
4 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. I 1995). 
s Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (also known as the 
Washington Convention) [hereinafter CITES]. The treaty came into effect in 
1975, after ratification by ten states. 
6 The difficulty and complexity in seeking to control illegal international 
trade in live specimens is artfully set out in DoNoVAN WEBSTER, The Looting 
and Smuggling and Fencing and Hoarding of Impossibly Precious, Feathered 
and Scaly Wild Things, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 27. The 
author follows the trail of smuggled radiated tortoises from a Florida bust of a 
smuggling ring back to their collection in the wilds of Madagascar. Id. The 
local people who collected the animals received 30 cents for a live tortoise that 
will fetch thousands of dollars from the illegal collector in the United States. 
Mr. Webster suggests that there is a $10-$20 billion black market in endangered 
animals and plants around the world. Id. 
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context for the ESA, which includes the "risk of ex'tinction," 
"public policy risk," and "implementation risk." Ne::-.1, the Arti-
cle examines and compares portions of the ESA with CITES, as 
well as the laws of Malawi? and the Kempthome Bill,s to under-
stand how different legal language impacts the risk of species ex-
tinction. The Article concludes that the ESA strikes the 
appropriate balance by seeking to protect species from ex'tinction 
according to the following criteria: (1) preservation of species 
should occur at the ecological level, (2) habitat must be pro-
tected, and (3) there should be an affirmative duty upon the gov-
ernment to seek the recovery of a species. 
I 
THE RisK CoNTEXT 
The word "risk" has an innate negative aspect.9 To say that 
something is risky is to suggest that there are possible negative 
outcomes. The terms "negative" and "risk" both have meaning 
only within the human mind, where values and preferences are 
attached to outcomes. The earth, as a physical entity, and spe-
cies, as groups of related entities, make no such value judgments. 
The earth does not care whether one, a hundred, or a million 
species exist upon its surface and in its waters; the forces of the 
universe and the rules of Darwinian selection will continue to 
operate, without judgments of good or bad. An eagle about to 
eat the last snake of a species does not balance the eagle's inter-
est against the need to preserve the snake species. 
For this Article there are three different contexts for the 
word "risk" which will be discussed in order. The first is the "risk 
of extinction." This is primarily a science-based prediction of 
7 Malawi was chosen because the author has visited the country and talked 
with government officials there. Passed in 1992, the Malawian law is represen-
tative of present African wildlife management as opposed to the prior colonial 
government. Many other African laws reviewed by the author arc not as com-
prehensive, and therefore it is more difficult to understand the legislative per-
spective of those countries. An African country was chosen because while the 
law is written in English, thus eliminating translation problems, it represents a 
different cultural perspective of wildlife. 
s The Kempthome Bill represents an extreme position within the United 
States. This bill and its backers sought to dismantle the Endangered Species 
Act. See infra note 24. 
9 While it is possible to say, "There is a risk you will win the $1 million 
lottery," the more likely proposition is: "There is a risk you will lose your 
money in the lottery." 
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possible future outcomes. It is akin to the concept of "risk as-
sessment" in the pollution side of environmentallaw.to The sec-
ond is "public policy risk," which is related to the concept of risk 
management.11 The third, "implementation risk," has not previ-
ously been singled out for individual analysis. It is the risk that 
the objectives of the law-the reduction or removal of the threat 
to the species-will never come to fruition. Both public policy 
risk and implementation risk are defined in detaillater.12 
A. Risk of Extinction 
It is a human premise that the preservation of other species 
on the planet should impose a constraint on human action. The 
development of this notion is beyond the scope of this Article 
and will simply be accepted as an operational premise.13 How-
ever, while acknowledging its existence, it must also be recog-
nized that it is not shared with equal conviction by all the states 
of the world; nor does it mean that all humans feel their actions 
should be constrained by that premise.t4 
The transformation of the ethical premise into a legal re-
straint of human action is not as straightforward as one might 
think. There is seldom a clear single action which should be pro-
1o Former EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus suggested that on the 
issue of chemical pollution, "risk assessment is an exercise that combines avail-
able data on a substance's potency in causing adverse health effects with infor· 
mation about likely human exposure, and through the use of plausible 
assumptions, it generates an estimate of human health risk." William D. Ruck-
elshaus, Risk, Science and Democracy, IssuES OF SciENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 
Spring 1985, at 19-38, reprinted in FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND PoLICY SO (Richard L. Revesz ed. 1997). 
!d. 
11 Ruckelshaus explains: 
Risk management [of chemical pollution] is the process by which a pro-
tective agency decides what action to take in the face of such [risk assess-
ment factors]. Ideally the action is based on such factors as the goals of 
public health and environmental protection, relevant legislation, legal 
precedent, and application of social, economic, and political values. 
12 See infra notes 16-27 and accompanying text. 
13 See generally, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Ell· 
vironment, Principles 3-5 at 4, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14, revised by U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf. 48/14/Rev. 1 (1972); World Charter for Nature, U.N. Doc. A/Res/37n 
(1982); Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. AI 
Conf.151/S, revised by U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/S/Rev.1(1992). 
14 The tortoise collector in Madagascar understands that the rarity of the 
species is what makes it valuable. Although he realizes that his actions may 
drive the species to extinction, he continues nevertheless. See Webster, supra 
note 6. 
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hibited. Instead, the risk of extinction arises out of a number of 
actions or non-actions, each of which imposes a degree or level of 
risk on a species. It is also clear that to prohibit all human action 
which might impose any risk on another species is not politically 
or economically acceptable or necessary. Therefore, the first 
political decision relevant to this issue for each state to decide is 
what level of risk of extinction is acceptable to that society. To 
do this there must be some understanding of the nature and de-
grees of risk which various courses of action represent. As a gov-
erninent seeks to lower the risk of extinction, it will often 
increase interference with human activity. 
Before moving to the specifics of the legislation, it is impor-
tant to understand the potentially different roles of science in 
public policy. The U.S. political system does not give any polit-
ical decision-making power to science or scientists. However, sci-
ence can play two important roles in the preservation of species. 
First, it can provide the best available information about the 
present state of the physical world to those who make the deci-
sions: the elected representatives or administrators of our laws. 
Second, it can attempt to assess the risk of extinction based upon 
existing conditions. Science cannot decide what level of risk of 
extinction is acceptable to the American public or to any particu-
lar state. Still, the political process may decide that the best 
course of action is to make the administrative decision-making 
process as scientific as possible. Congress can decide that scien-
tific and ecological information should dominate the administra-
tive decision-making process, rather than ethical, cultural, 
economic or political interests. On the other hand, ethical con-
siderations may at times become a dominant factor in wildlife 
issues.15 
The risk of extinction for a given species is a science-driven 
projection of population dynamics. For some species, there is no 
foreseeable risk of extinction. Good examples of this group are 
species that have adapted to human populations, such as the ur-
ban rat and the pigeon. For other species, like the American bi-
15 Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the importation of seals is 
prohibited while they are still nursing or if they are taken in a manner deemed 
inhumane. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(b) (1994). Likewise, ethical concerns have sup-
ported continued efforts to block commercial whaling, even where science has 
reported that a whale species is no longer in danger of ex'tinction. See Alexan-
der Gillespie, The Ethical Question in d1e Whaling Debate, 9 GEo.INT'L ENVn-
L. REv. 355 (1997). 
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son and the sandhill crane, it may be foreseeable that future 
human activity could put a species at risk, but no such risk exists 
at this time. Finally, there are some species, such as the black 
rhino and the loggerhead turtle, which are clearly at risk of 
extinction. 
However, while we look to science to make judgments that 
are predictive of the future and not just statements of present 
facts, science cannot make such decisions. Scientists may be willM 
ing to place species in categories, but they are usually not willing 
or able to place a number on the risk, e.g., "there' is a 40% 
chance that the black rhino will be extinct in the wild in ten years 
assuming no new measures are adopted to change the present 
courses of events." Therefore, while it is an obligation of science 
to provide information concerning the risk of extinction faced by 
a species, one can not expect exact calculations or clearMcut 
numbers. 
B. Public Policy Risk 
"Public policy risk" is the outcome of the political process as 
it decides what level of risk of extinction is acceptable to society. 
This risk is seldom stated explicitly; rather, it is reflected in the 
language of the law adopted. The legislative decision about 
when to start protective intervention on behalf of a species is a 
good example.16 This might occur at the first sign of a population 
decline, or when science determines there is a chance of extincM 
tion within twenty years, or perhaps only when science concludes 
that there is a likelihood of extinction within twenty years. 
In making this decision, each political body (legislature) deM 
cides within a matrix of risk factors. Part of the context (a risk 
matrix) in which these decisions are made include: moral beliefs, 
ecological protection, economic expansion, religious beliefs, culM 
tural history, and the physical well-being of the citizenry. 
Some examples can illustrate the operation of the risk maM 
trix. First, an individual may believe that it is morally wrong to 
do something that would result in the loss of a species. This per-
16 This is similar to the decisions of the federal government about acceptable 
levels of risk concerning automobiles. In this arena, the issue is how much 
safety should be mandated by the federal government, at what risk of human 
injury, and at what cost to the consumers and voters of the country. See gener-
ally Steven W. Potter and Robert C. Witt, On the Demand for Liability Insur-
ance: An Insurance Economics Perspective, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1681 (1994). 
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son will take fewer risks with an "at risk" species and may seek to 
intervene and protect that species sooner than he or she other-
wise would. Second, some species are very important to the 
functioning of local ecosystems, for example, pollinators like the 
bee and habitat modifiers like the elephant. It might be wise to 
take fewer risks with these species, as their loss would directly 
affect other species. Third, economic impact is demonstrated by 
the spotted owl controversy in the United States. The more pro-
tection that is given the spotted owl through habitat preservation, 
the fewer the number of trees that can be cut down by the lum-
ber industry. Fourth, the prohibition on the killing of eagles in-
terferes with the religious rituals of some Native Americans 
which call for feathers from recently killed eaglesP Similarly, 
Intuits believe that the killing of whales is integral to their cul-
ture. Fmally, how does one balance the protection of a species 
with the likelihood that, by increasing the population of a spe-
cies, there will be an increase in the physical risk to human 
beings?18 
In the context of the United States, economic considerations 
constitute the most significant limitation on human protection of 
various species. Protecting a species requires habitat protection 
and controlling or eliminating the commercial market for the 
animal. Thus, new leopard skin coats are no longer available, 
and housing projects are changed in density and location to ac-
commodate the needs of a butterfiy.19 Economic consequences 
17 The state of Nevada faced this issue: 
As the claimant's affidavits demonstrate, e};perts in comparative religion 
have likened the status of the eagle feather in Indian religion to that of 
the cross in the Christian faith. In that the eagle feather enjoys such an 
exalted status in the Indian religion, any scheme which limits the access of 
the faithful to their talisman must be seen as having a profound effect on 
the exercise of religious belief. 
See United States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. 269, 276 (D. Nev. 
1986). 
18 For instance, consider balancing the interests of protecting elephants and 
tigers, both of which are known to kill humans. See Save the Elephants: Start 
Shooting Them, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Nov. 25, 1996, at 51. "Elephants 
are the darlings of the Western world, but they are enemy No. 1 in Kenya," says 
David Western, head of the Kenya Wildlife Service. !d. In a period of six years, 
wildlife, consisting of predominately elephants, killed 400 Kenyans. Id. See 
also Peter Matthiessen, Tiger in dze Snow, THE NEW YoRKER, Jan. 6, 1997, at 
58, 62 ("Miquelle had told me that tigers in Primorski Krni take about one 
human life each year, a fact that lends a certain edge to walking in the taiga."). 
19 Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 979-80 
(1985). See also Nat'l. Assoc. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 949 F. Supp. 1 
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flow from both the loss of private economic gain from prohibited 
activities and from the public and private resources expended in 
seeking protection and the recovery of the species. Of course, 
there is also the considerable weight of ecological protection and 
enhancement that comes from the protection of a single listed 
species within an ecosystem. How should the decision-makers 
weigh all these divergent factors? 
Even if there is agreement about what level of risk is neces-
sary or appropriate for a given society, there may be considera-
ble disagreement about what course of action will provide the 
best protection for species. There will be disagreement about 
whether the action should be passive (criminal prohibitions) or 
active (management recovery programs like the reintroduction of 
the wolf into the Yellowstone National Park). It is in this bub-
bling mud pot20 of conflict and contradiction that we make our 
public policy. Back in the 1970s when the ESA and CITES were 
shaped out of the mud and placed in the wall of public policy, the 
depth of the conflicting interests were not as apparent as they are 
today. There had not been a spotted owl controversy, and ele-
phant ivory did not have a black market. The full set of restric-
tive consequences to human activities when preserving and 
helping another species recover was not readily apparent when 
the ESA and CITES were adopted. After twenty-five years of 
experience, the costs and benefits of such courses of action are 
more apparent. As noted in Section III, infra, both represent a 
public policy which is strongly protective of species at risk of 
extinction. 
C. Implementation Risk 
To focus solely on the adopted public policy risk is to over-
look the full picture. Pretty words can hide an unpleasant reality. 
The full story cannot be understood without consideration of a 
third kind of risk: implementation risk. This is the danger that 
the adopted public policy, as reflected in the language of the stat-
ute or regulation, will never be, or will only partly be, achieved in 
(D.D.C. 1996) (dealing with the impact of listing the Delhi Sands Flower-loving 
Fly on San Bernardino County's attempt to construct a hospital on one of the 
species' last remaining habitats). 
20 The best place to observe mud pots in the United States is at Yellowstone 
National Park, in the general area of the geyser "Old Faithful"-which is not as 
faithful as it used to be. 
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the real world. It is the risk that the law will not work; that it will 
not be effectively implemented. The risk is that, notwithstanding 
the positive words of the public law, the threat to the threatened 
species will not be reduced or modified. 
One type of implementation risk concerns the level of re-
sources which the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment allocate to the task of realizing the objectives of the law. 
The legislature can pass a strong law but allocate no money for 
its implementation. There may be short term political gain for 
the politicians passing the new law but not sufficient interest to 
justify the expenditure of real money. Obviously, while this may 
help the politicians, it is not helpful for reducing the risk of ex-
tinction faced by species. The U.S. experienced a minor episode 
of this problem when, for a period of time, funds necessary for 
the listing of new endangered species under the ESA were inten-
tionally blocked by Congress.21 
Certain risks in the administrative process of species protec-
tion are predictable and preventable. For example, consider the 
issue of ports of entry for importation into the U.S. of endan-
gered or threatened species. The law may provide that certain 
species or products containing endangered species are importa-
ble only \vith an appropriate permit. However, identification of 
the species product (reptile skin boots) may be difficult for the 
average custom agent. Foreign permits in various languages may 
be difficult to understand. If an importer is allowed to use any 
port of entry into the U.S., careful review and inspection of wild-
life would be impossible. It is not financially feasible to have a 
21 Upset by the economic impacts of the Endangered Species Act, the new 
Republican Congress cut off all funds to the Fish and \Vddlife Service for the 
cost of listing of new species in 1995. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-6, Ch. IV, 109 Stat. 73, 86 {1995). For over one year there 
were no new listings of endangered species, as there was no paid staff to under-
take the process. The Republicans were seeking to maintain the status quo, 
with respect to the size of the endangered species list, while simultaneously 
seeking a redraft of the ESA that would have significantly changed the public 
policy risk. They were unsuccessful in changing the law during the 104th Con-
gress. See Kempthome Bill, infra note 24. As an example of the impact of the 
restriction imposed by Public Law 104-6, when the Service relisted the Ameri-
can bald eagle from endangered to threatened, the Service could not list the 
bald eagle of Mexico as endangered because of the moratorium. See Fmal Rule 
to Reclassify the Bald Eagle, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,000.01 {1995) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. § 17). See generally, Jeffrey S. Kopf, Slamming Shut tlze Ark Doors: 
Congress's Attack on tlze Listing Process of d1e Endangered Species Act, 3 
ANIMAL L. 103 (1997). 
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reptile skin expert available at every port of entry. Therefore, 
the regulatory scheme must take this into account, and a good 
scheme will require all reptile skin importers to use a limited 
number of ports of entry where it is realistic that an expert may 
be available to assure full compliance with the law.22 Attempts 
to import at other ports of entry are illegal,23 and custom officials 
at non-designated ports should be empowered to simply seize the 
suspect goods without specific knowledge of the identity of the 
specific species involved. The more serious a state is about con-
trolling the risk of extinction, the harder it will strive to reduce 
the implementation risk. 
Perhaps one of the most serious problems of analysis in the 
area of species protection is the problem of the false positive, the 
creation of a public policy sham. This occurs when a state, by its 
legislature or executive branch, seeks to create the appearance of 
a strong, protectionist, risk reduction policy by law or order, 
with the full knowledge and belief that it will never be realized 
because of a high implementation risk. This can and does occur 
when states seek to appear to care about wildlife protection be-
cause of internal and international political needs, while actually 
operating upon a different risk analysis. One example of this was 
when the amendments to the ESA were introduced in the 1041h 
Congress as part of the Republican Revolution.24 
Since the Republicans did not believe it politically accepta-
ble to eliminate the ESA, they set out to draft a set of provisions 
that would retain the shell of a protective law, yet have such a 
high implementation risk that the regulatory outcome would be 
the same as if there were no protection for endangered species at 
all.25 This Article considers the language of the Kempthorne 
bill,26 even though it was not adopted, because it represents a 
strikingly different vision about where the balance point should 
be between protecting a species and interfering with human ac-
22 While there are approximately 400 points of entry for the United States, 
the· Secretary of the Interior has limited wildlife entry to 12 named ports. See 
50 C.P.R. § 14.11 (1997). 
23 16 u.s.c. § 1538(!)(1) (1994). 
24 See S. 1364, 104th Cong. (1995). While there was both a House and a 
Senate Bill, the provisions referred to in this Article will be those of the Senate 
bill as introduced by Senator Kempthome and sponsored by Senator 
Kempthome and others. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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tivity. It is very illustrative of what roads the ESA has been able 
to avoid taking over its twenty-five year history. 
Fmally, even when protective legislation is adopted in good 
faith and the implementation risks are minimized, there may be 
unforeseeable negative events that frustrate the public policy risk 
goals. For instance, in the 1980s, black-footed ferrets numbered 
less than fifty in the wild, and several were removed for captive 
breeding under a recovery program.27 Shortly after the removal, 
canine distemper struck one of the few remaining populations in 
the wild and \viped them out. Due to both unforeseeable hin-
drances and implementation risks such as this, it is often prudent 
to construct any program or legislation with more risk reduction 
than might otherwise seem necessary. Such an outlook is precau-
tionary in nature. 
II 
COMPARATIVE LEGISLATIVE REsPONSES TO RISK 
What is the balance point found in the ESA between protec-
tion of the species and interference with human activities? If the 
balance point were to be set at different points, what might it 
look like? The following analysis examines three key provisions 
of the ESA in detail and compares them to several other politi-
cally created risk matrixes, including: CITES, the wildlife laws of 
Mala\vi (which are representative of the African approach to 
wildlife issues) and finally, the Kempthome Bill. 
In determining a certain law's response to risk, many issues 
must be addressed. First, how do you define species? Second, 
what is the threshold for the listing of a species? The conse-
quence of setting the threshold is significant-a lower threshold 
leads to a more protective law, and therefore a more risk-averse 
policy. Third, for a listed species, what prohibitions are imposed 
upon human activity? Answering this question entails determin-
ing what acts are criminal acts, and what activities protect habitat 
from destruction. Fourth, does the listing of a species trigger any 
affirmative duty to help the species recover? The following Sec-
tion of this Article examines how the four different legal re-
27 See Gallick v. Barto, 828 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (M.D. Pa. 1993) {describing 
the near extinction of the black-footed ferret in the wild, and subsequent imple-
mentation of captive breeding programs at the Wyoming Game and FISh De-
partment and the National Zoological Park at Front Royal, Virginia). 
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gimes-ESA, CITES, the laws of Malawi, and the Kempthorne 
Bill-attempt to answer these very complex questions. 
A. Defining a Species 
Before asking science for a number count to determine if a 
species is at an endangered population level, there is a significant 
policy issue that must be addressed. When the term "endan-
gered" is used, should the context be strictly biological or should 
it be ecological? Is the goal to allow a species to perform its 
function in those ecological systems in which it is located, or is it 
to preserve a viable breeding population of the species some-
where on the earth (in a zoo perhaps) so that the genetic code of 
the species is preserved? The argument of the environmentalist 
is that the purpose of protecting endangered species is to keep 
them functional in the ecological sense. To have a breeding pop-
ulation in a zoo may preserve the biological existence of the spe-
cies, but it will be ecologically extinct.28 
For example, if the test is biological extinction, then the 
American bald eagle should never have been listed as threatened 
and endangered in the lower forty-eight states. Since there has 
always been a biologically and ecologically healthy population of 
American bald eagles in Alaska, scientists could never have pre-
dicted biological extinction even if the eagle was eliminated from 
all the lower forty-eight states. However, since the ESA allows 
an ecological rather than biological focus, the eagle was pro-
tected outside Alaska. With the protection of the ESA, a popu-
lation recovery has been realized in many of the lower 48 
states.29 
For the United States, the outcome of this policy debate ap-
pears in the definition of "species." Under the ESA, an ecologi-
cal focus is allowed by defining the term "species" to include 
28 After several decades of working in the area of endangered species, I be-
lieve, but cannot prove, that this is an important dividing line for many individ-
uals. While most environmentalists seek to preserve the ecological role of 
species, many of those who object to the strict controls on human activity will 
accept interference with human activity only at the risk of biological extinction, 
and will not accept that geographically different groups of the same species 
should be protected for ecological reasons. 
29 See 60 Fed. Reg. 36,000-01 (1995), which sets out some of the history of 
the status of the bald eagle. This notice reduced the status of the eagle under 
the ESA from endangered to threatened. 
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population groups.30 An ecological approach is also allowed 
under CITES, which uses the phrase "geographically separate 
population" in its definition of species.31 The provisions of 
CITES further reinforce this ecological perspective by requiring 
the Scientific Authority of each member state to keep the popu-
lation level of a species "at a level consistent with its role in the 
ecosystems in which it occurs."32 Under the Kempthome Bill, 
subspecies and distinct population segments would have been al-
lowed only if it could be proven that the group was genetically 
isolated.33 This would have significantly increased the risk of lo-
cal ecological extinction for many species. 
For a different perspective, consider the law of the African 
country of Malawi. Under the Malawian law, which was adopted 
in 1992,34 there are neither endangered nor threatened species.35 
The law creates the category of "protected species." The defini-
tion of this term is different from the definition under the ESA 
for endangered species. A protected species may refer to "all of 
some species in a specified area, or to varieties of a species, in-
30 "The term 'species' includes any sub-species of fish or wildlife or plants, 
and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife 
which interbreeds when mature." 16 U.S.C. § 1532{16) {1994). 
31 See CITES, supra note 5, art. I (a), 27 U.S.T at 1090, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245: 
"'Species' means any species, subspecies, or geographically separate population 
thereof." 
32 Article IV(3) states: 
3. A Scientific Authority in each Party shall monitor both the ex-port per-
mits granted by that State for specimens of species included in Appendix 
II and the actual exports of such specimens. Whenever a Scientific Au-
thority determines that the export of specimens of any such species should 
be limited in order to maintain that species throughout its range at a level 
consistent with its role in the ecosystems in which it occurs and well above 
the level at which that species might become eligible for inclusion in Ap-
pendix I, the Scientific Authority shall advise the appropriate Manage-
ment Authority of suitable measures to be taken to limit the grant of 
export permits for specimens of that species. 
CITES, supra note 5, art. IV (3), 27 U.S.T at 1095-96, 993 U.N.T.S. at 247. 
33 The proposed bill stated: 
SPECIES. The term "species" (A) means a biological species; and (B) 
includes any subspecies of naturally occurring fish or wildlife or plants, 
and any genetically distinct population segment of any species of verte-
brate fish or wildlife, only if it can be demonstrated that there exist a 
complete lack of gene flow into occupied habitat of the subspecies or dis-
tinct population segment. 
S. 1364, 104th Cong. at 12 (1995). 
34 National Parks and Wlldlife Act, No. 11 (1992) (Malawi). 
35 There is a designation of "dangerous animals," which is not found in the 
ESA. This list includes elephants and big cats. Id. § 2. 
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eluding sex and age groups."36 This would allow almost any 
grouping of animals to be considered protected, but the regula-
tory scheme is entirely different from the ESA. This definition is 
adequate from their perspective, because all issues are manage-
ment issues. This listing of a species under the law of Malawi has 
no impact on economic development and therefore, unlike in the 
United States, there is little political concern with the crossing of 
the threshold of listing a species. The definition of "species" it-
self is not that important in the Malawi system. 
The focus of the law of Malawi, and many other African 
countries, is species management with an eye toward sport hunt-
ing. A hint of this perspective in the law is indicated by the sec-
tion which states "for purposes of this Act, protected species of 
animals shall be classified as game species."37 The Malawian law 
defines wildlife in the nature of management groups rather than 
as an endangered or threatened species. Part of the reason for 
this different approach is that Malawi has a different outlook to-
ward utilization of species, even those that are endangered. 
Many Southern African states believe that wildlife, even endan-
gered wildlife, should be used on a sustainable basis to realize 
economic potential.38 Assuming that a sustainable management 
program is adopted, this would allow the sport hunting of rhinos 
and elephants. 
B. Listing a Species 
A key policy question that must be decided when setting the 
public policy risk level deals with the threshold of listing the spe-
cies and what factors should be part of that decision. While 
many factors might come into play, two primary routes are avail-
able. The first is to make it primarily a scientific issue, e.g., focus-
ing solely on whether the species is at risk of extinction. The 
second route allows non-scientific factors to be considered.39 
This changes the issue to the following query: should the deci-
36 ld. § 43(2). 
37 ld. § 44(1). 
38 See David Favre, Debate Within the CITES Community: What Direction 
for the Future?, 33 NAT. REsouRCES J. 875, 888 (1993). 
39 The ESA contains within it a clear example of the balancing approach. In 
determining the critical habitat for a listed species, the Secretary is directed to 
do so, "on the basis of the best scientific data available and after taking into 
consideration the economic impact, and other relevant impact, of specifying any 
particular area as critical habitat." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994). 
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 
HeinOnline -- 6 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 355 1997-1998
1998] THE RISK OF EXTINCTION 355 
sion to list a species be balanced against the expected loss of 
human activity, in particular, the loss of property value and the 
restrictions on economic exploitation of the species being 
considered? 
In the rush of good will that existed in the early environmen-
tal movement of the 1970s, as well as the unforeseeability of the 
consequences of its own action, Congress adopted a non-balanc-
ing, scientific approach to the issue of when to list a species. 
Thus, under the ESA, the Secretary of the Interior is directed to 
list a species "solely on the basis of the best scientific and com-
mercial data available to him after conducting a review of the 
status of the species .... "40 Clearly, the ESA takes a strongly 
protective position. 
One interesting point about the ESA is that neither the law 
nor the regulations actually define the key term "endangered." 
Thus, as various Secretaries of the Interior come and go in \Vash-
ington D.C., the standards for listing a species may fluctuate. 
While the Administrative Procedure Act would not let such an 
action be "arbitrary" and "capricious" or \vithout sufficient fac-
tual evidence,41 there is nevertheless room for some exercise of 
discretion. Additionally, there is the implementation risk that 
even though a species as a matter of science should be listed, 
economic or political pressures may prevent its listing. For exam-
ple, the first time the Fish and Wildlife Service faced the issue of 
the spotted owl, it declined to list the species. In the 1980s, 
notwithstanding the opinion of almost all owl experts, the Fish 
and Wildlife Service refused to list the species as endangered. 
But for the power of our federal courts to overturn arbitrary and 
capricious administrative decisions, this politically "hot" species 
would not have received the protection it needed.42 Imagine how 
40 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (1994). 
41 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). 
42 See, e.g., Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. 
Wash. 1988). There, the Court sharply criticized the FISh and \Vlldlife Service's 
arbitrariness: 
The Court will reject conclusory assertions of agency "ex-pertise" where 
the agency spurns unrebutted ex-pert opinions without itself offering a 
credible alternative explanation .... Here, the Service disregarded all the 
expert opinion on population viability, including that of its own ex-pert, 
that the owl is facing extinction, and instead merely asserted its expertise 
in support of its conclusions. 
The Service has failed to provide its own or other ex-pert analysis 
supporting its conclusions. Such analysis is necessary to establish a ra-
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easy it would be for an agency that did not have the science stan-
dard imposed upon it to ignore a species that represents conflict-
ing economic and political interests within a government. The 
existence of independent review by our judiciary is an important 
element for lowering the implementation risk in the United 
States. It is an element that does not exist in many other 
countries. 
Under the provisions of CITES, species are to be listed 
under Appendix I (endangered), when the Party States find that 
they (1) are threatened with extinction and (2) are, or may be, 
affected by (international) trade.43 While Article X.V of the 
treaty sets out the process for listing a species, it does not suggest 
the extent to which scientific or political analysis should go into 
the decision-making. Though the standards are factual and 
therefore science-based, they are without specific definition, and 
there is a perception among some delegates to CITES that polit-
ical pressure and ecological protectionism have been the basis for 
listing or not listing some species. For example, many believe 
that at the 8th Conference of the Parties, Sweden withdrew its 
proposal for listing the bluefin tuna because of political pressure 
from other countries.44 At the 1994 Conference of the Parties, an 
adopted resolution set out in significant detail scientific criteria 
for deciding when a species was threatened with extinction.45 
Clearly, the public policy sought by the Party States is the low 
risk position of a science driven answer to the question of when 
to list a species. 
For those that were seeking to make the CITES listing pro-
cess science-driven, they may or may not be satisfied with the 
tional connection between the evidence presented and the Service's deci· 
sion. Accordingly, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's decision 
not to list at this time the northern spotted owl as endangered or 
threatened under the Endangered Species Act was arbitrary and capri· 
cious and contrary to law. 
Id. (citation omitted). The story of the spotted owl contains significant subse· 
quent litigation in which the focus shifted to critical habitat issues. See Seattle 
Audubon Society v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996); Seattle Audubon 
Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 952 
F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991). 
43 CITES, supra note 5, art. II (1), 27 U.S.T at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245. 
44 See DavidS. Favre, Trade in Endangered Species, 3 Y.B. INT'L. ENVTL. L. 
317, 320 (1992). 
45 CITES, Ninth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Resolution of the 
Conference of the Parties, Conf. 9.24, Nov. 7-18, 1994 [hereinafter Conf. 9.24] 
(materials on file with the author). 
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outcome. There is a fundamental difference between the ESA 
and CITES as to who is making the decision, even though both 
seek to use primarily scientific information. Under the ESA, ad-
ministrators of the law make the decision; if their decisions are 
not in compliance, their actions may be overturned by a court of 
law. However, the decision to list a species under CITES is made 
by representatives of the Party States, not administrators, and 
their decision is not reviewable by any court of law. A legislative 
decision-maker cannot be expected to focus exclusively on sci-
ence when making a decision. 
The Malawian listing process is not limited to scientific in-
formation and there is no limitation as to the number of factors 
that can be considered when listing a species.46 Thus, it is fully in 
the discretion of the executive branch of the government to de-
cide if and when a species should be listed as "protected." The 
outcome of the risk analysis-assessing scientific, economic, so-
cial, ecological and personal safety factors-can vary from time 
to time as the executive branch of government sees fit. This ap-
proach eliminates the possibility of judicial review and represents 
an abandonment by the legislative branch of its right to shape the 
decisions of the executive branch.47 While this gives the execu-
tive branch great flexibility, it does not create predictable risk 
reduction for species and poses a high level of implementation 
risk. 
The Kempthome bill takes a different route. It does not 
change the science-based standard; rather .. it seeks to signifi-
cantly discourage the listing of new species through the imple-
mentation risk of delay. For example, consider how the 
Kempthome bill would have dealt with the listing of foreign en-
dangered species. Under the ESA, the criteria and process for 
listing species is identical for foreign and domestic species. 
Under the Kempthome bill, before any proposed listing of a for-
eign species by the Secretary via regulation could be made, the 
proposal would have been conveyed in the language of that na-
46 National Parks and Wildlife Act, No. 11, § 43(1) (?vlalawi) ("The Minister 
may, from time to time ... declare any species of wild plant or wild animal ••. 
as a protected species under this Act."). 
47 At the time of the adoption of this law the country had only one real 
political party and was ruled by President for Life H. Kamuzu Banda. Since 
that time Malawi had elections which resulted in a peaceful transfer of power to 
a new president. What impact this may have on legislation and protection of 
endangered species remains to be seen. 
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tion, with supporting materials, to each government where the 
species is naturally found (the "range state"). The material 
would have to include an impact statement for the action within 
the range states, and the states contacted would have not less 
than 180 days to comment on the proposal.48 In subsequent dis-
cussion, if the foreign country believes that more study is neces-
sary (e.g., population levels or threats to habitat), then the 
Secretary of Interior must help to find funds for carrying out the 
study. One should remember that wildlife studies may take sev-
eral years from the point of seeking funding to the release of a 
final report. 
After all this possible delay, the Kempthorne Bill would still 
not allow the listing of a foreign species as endangered without 
the concurrence of the range states, unless approval is obtained 
from the President of the United States.49 Obviously, the deci-
sions of a foreign country, approving or disapproving a U.S. list-
ing, are not subject to judicial review in the United States. The 
entire process could delay the listing of a foreign species for 
years. It also makes the process much more political. Thus, 
without changing the appearance of a science-based decision for 
species listing, the Kempthorne Bill adopted a process that would 
have made the reality of listing, or reducing risk for new species, 
very unlikely. 
In contrast to the ESA, the issue of what constitutes an en-
dangered species is directly addressed in the Kempthorne Bill. It 
stated that "'endangered species' means any species that, if no 
action were taken under this Act, would be placed on an irrevers-
ible course of extinction within 2 human generations .. . "so The 
use of the human life span as a reference point is curious and 
arbitrary especially when compared to CITES, where the 
adopted listing criteria go on for over twenty pages.s1 
C. Prohibitions on Human Actions 
After having listed a species, the next critical point of analy-
sis is understanding what level of protection a species should re-
ceive under the law. The usual approach is to make the 
48 S. 1364, 104th Cong. (1995), at 18-19. 
49 Id. at 20. 
50 Id. at 8. Forty years is shorter than the lifetime of an elephant, but may 
represent 80 generations of the butterfly. 
51 See Conf. 9.24, supra note 45. 
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obtaining, possessing and shipping of a specimen of a listed spe-
cies illegal, unless an exception applies or the individual has a 
state-issued permit. The ESA contains a long list of prohibited 
acts which includes taking, possessing and selling.s:z. In fact, it 
may be the most extensive listing of prohibited acts of any na-
tional legislation. 
The ESA has layers of definitions beyond the list of prohib-
ited acts in 16 U.S.C. §1538. While this section prohibits the tak-
ing of a listed species, the term "take" is further defined 
elsewhere in the law to include a wide range of actions, including: 
"to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, 
or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."S3 By 
regulation, the Secretary further defined the term "harm" to in-
clude destruction of habitat, rendering the reach of the ESA ex-
tensive.54 Acts of economic development on private property, 
which may or may not be part of the critical habitat for the spe-
cies, can subject an individual to criminal sanctions even if an 
individual animal is never seen. No corpus delicti is required. 
52 (1)Except as provided in sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of this title, with 
respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 
1533 of this title, it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States to-
(A) import any such species into, or export any such species from the 
United States; 
(B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of 
the United States; 
(C) take any such species upon the high seas; 
(D) possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship, by any means whatso-
ever, any such species taken in violation of subparagraphs (B) and (C); 
(E) deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or foreign com-
merce, by any means whatsoever and in the course of a commercial activ-
ity, any such species; 
(F) sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce any such spe-
cies; or 
(G) violate any regulation pertaining to such species or to any threatened 
species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title and 
promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to authority provided by this 
chapter. 
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1994). 
53 Id. § 1532(19). 
54 Under the implementing administrative code, the term "harm" is defined 
by the Secretary of the Interior as to "include significant habitat modification or 
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing 
essential behavioral patterns including breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 
C.F.R § 17 3 (1997). 
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This definition was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Courtss and be-
came a major point of contention with those unhappy about the 
reach of the ESA. The present definition of harm clearly sets the 
balance point strongly on the side of species protection. 
The backers of the Kempthome bill strongly disagreed with 
the idea that the reach of the ESA should extend to the destruc-
tion of habitat on private lands. The definition of "take" would 
have been significantly modified under the Kempthorne bill. The 
proposed definition would have preempted the existing regula-
tory definition by providing that the term "take": "(A) means to 
proximately and foreseeably physically injure, kill, or reduce to 
possession an identifiable member of the species; and (B) in-
cludes proximately and foreseeably modifying habitat of the spe-
cies so as to affect a member of the species in the manner 
described in subparagraph (A)."S6 
The addition of the word "foreseeably" weakens the protec-
tive nature of the provision, making the burden of proof on the 
state higher in an enforcement action. The terms "harass," 
"harm," and "pursue" are omitted, and presumably such acts 
would be legal. Under the Kempthome bill, it would be accepta-
ble to chase eagles and wolves with airplanes until they reached 
exhaustion. Habitat modification would not be prohibited unless 
the act of modification resulted in the discovery of a dead body 
of a listed species. The Kempthome bill strikes the balance be-
tween protection of species and interference with human activity 
at a different point-one that leans more toward freedom of 
human action. 
The ESA contains another major thrust in the nature of a 
prohibition. Under § 7 of the Act, no federal action (project or 
permit approval) may proceed until there has been assurance 
55 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 
515 U.S. 687 {1995). The Court, in upholding the regulation as promulgated, 
stated that "[t]he latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute, 
together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, 
establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's reasonable 
interpretation." ld. at 703. The Court held that a broad interpretation of 
"harm" was clearly intended by Congress, and the term should be considered 
distinct from the other words used to define "take." Specifically, the Court 
stated, "The Secretary's interpretation of 'harm' to include indirectly injuring 
endangered animals through habitat modification permissibly interprets 'harm' 
to have 'a character of its own not to be submerged by its association.'" !d. at 
702 (citation omitted). 
56 S. 1364, 104th Cong. (1995) at 13. 
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that the action will not "jeopardize the continued existence of 
any endangered species" or result in the destruction of habitat 
that is critical to the species.57 This self-limitation on government 
action has the effect of giving protection of endangered species 
the trump card over other government projects. Whatever the 
project and its social, political or economic priority, the § 7 prohi-
bition allows the potential negative impact on endangered spe-
cies habitat to stop the project with no balancing of interests. 
This point was reinforced in one of the earlier ESA cases, which 
was the first to reach the Supreme Court. The case pitted the 
small snail darter against the mighty power of the dam-building, 
river stopping Tennessee Valley Authority (TV A). The agency 
was not allowed to close the gates of the Tellico dam, even 
though over $100 million had been spent on its construction, be-
cause the creation of a lake at the point of the dam would have 
destroyed the swift water river habitat of the snail darter. With 
some reluctance the Supreme Court held that Congress had spo-
ken, that no balancing was possible under the law, and that § 7 
would trump the TVA's goals and projects.ss 
By contrast, while the laws of Malawi have fairly encompass-
ing provisions protecting individual animals on the protected list, 
there is no such protection for the habitat of the protected spe-
cies. There is no identification of critical habitat, nor any limita-
tion on destruction of the habitat of protected species by either 
public or private development. However, habitat may indirectly 
be protected through the designation of an area as a park or 
wildlife reserve.59 
The laws of Malawi are focused on hunting by permit; there-
fore, the structure of prohibitions is different from that of the 
United States.60 The starting point is§ 47, which states that "any 
57 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). 
58 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Partly as a result 
of this conflict, Congress amended the law in 1978 to provide for a Committee 
that could issue an exemption to the requirements of the ESA under a limited 
set of circumstances. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (1994). The issue of the Tellico Dam 
went before the Committee, but the Committee decided not to grant an 
exemption. 
59 National Parks and Wildlife Act, No. 11, §§ 26-41 (Malawi). 
60 In the United States, sport hunting is traditionally controlled by the indi-
vidual states. In Malawi, the national government both controls sport hunting 
and the protection of species. This combination of both responsibilities at one 
level of government results in a provision of the Malawian law which makes it 
illegal to cause unnecessary or undue suffering to any wild animal. See id. § 83. 
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person who hunts or takes any protected species, except in ac-
cordance with the conditions of a licence ... shall be guilty of an 
offence." The term "take" is defined as "to wound, capture, or 
kill the animal, or to remove or destroy its nest or egg or any part 
of it."61 A separate provision makes the molesting or provoking 
of a protected animal illegal.62 Presumably these terms reach the 
same acts as "harass, harm and pursue" under the ESA. A sub-
sequent section, which deals with the commerce of wildlife, 
makes it illegal to possess, buy or sell a protected species without 
a licence. 63 
The CITES treaty has no equivalent provision for the ac-
tions of individuals. As a treaty between states, it does not seek 
to control the conduct of individuals, only states. Therefore, the 
prohibitions in the treaty relate to states allowing the importa-
tion or exportation without a CITES permit, rather than individ-
uals.64 Moreover, while the treaty has no authority to impose 
criminal sanctions, CITES also does not require that any state 
(or individual) protect the habitat of listed species.65 
D. Affirmative Duty 
The goals of ESA are to protect individual plants and ani-
mals of listed species, to identify and protect critical habitat, and 
ultimately to support the recovery of species so that they may 
eventually be delisted.66 These goals are realized in part by re-
In the United States, the issue of cruelty toward wild animals is covered under 
the laws of the states and not the federal government. 
61 ld. § 2. 
62 ld. § 82. 
63 ld. § 86. 
64 For example, "[T]he export of any specimen of a species included in Ap-
pendix I shall require the prior grant and presentation of a export permit." 
CITES, supra note 5, art. III (2), 27 U.S.T. at 246, 993 U.N.T.S. at 1093. 
65 The Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory 
Waterbirds, drafted and signed in 1996, is a representative international agree-
ment seeking to impose habitat protection obligations on states. 1t also seeks to 
impose the obligation to conserve a species, as is understood under the ESA. 
See, Art. II-III, Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory 
Waterbirds, 6 Y.B. lNr'L ENVIL. L. 306-07, 907-09 (1995). 
66 Specifically, the purposes of the ESA are: 
to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered spe-
cies and threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a pro-
gram for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened 
species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the pur-
poses of the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this 
section. 
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quiring the federal government to "conserve" a listed species.67 
The provisions of the ESA create an affirmative duty upon the 
Secretary of Interior to support the recovery of the species.6S The 
mandatory nature of the language has been recognized by the 
courts.69 However, this can be an expensive proposition. For ex-
ample, the expenditures, public and private, on behalf of the bald 
eagle amounted to $1 million per year for over a decade.1o Most 
countries are not willing to take this step in their legislation. 
While many governments do expend resources to help species 
recover, their laws do not create a legal mandate to do so, as does 
the ESA. There is no equivalent language in the law of Malawi. 
The neutralization of this affirmative duty was one of the 
key reconstruction efforts of the Kempthome bill. First, the bill 
changed the definition of "conserve." Under the Kempthome 
bill, the affirmative mandate was replaced by a simple reference: 
"The term 'conservation objective' and 'conservation plan' 
means [one] developed under section 5."71 Each species has its 
own "conservation plan," which may consist of "such level of 
conservation of the species and any critical habitat to be desig-
nated as the Secretary considers practicable and reasonable to 
the extent that the benefits of the conservation measures justify 
the human and economic costs of implementation for the [gov-
ernments], private sector and affected private individuals and or-
ganizations."72 In the alternative, the Kempthome bill provides 
that the Secretary may adopt the approach of "no Federal action 
other than enforcement against any person whose activity vio-
lates [section 9( a) prohibitions ]."73 Consequently, recovery of the 
species would become an option, but not a mandate, for the 
government. 
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) {1994). CITES does not have a purpose statement. 
fi1 "The terms 'conserve,' 'conserving,' and 'conservation' mean to use and 
the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endan-
gered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided 
pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary." ld. § 1532(3). 
68 "The Secretary ... shall establish and implement a program to conserve 
fish, wildlife and plants ... " Id. § 1534. 
69 See Carson-Thckee Water Conservancy District v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257. 
261 {9th Cir. 1984). 
70 See 60 C.F.R 36,000 {1997) for a discussion of the recovery program for 
the bald eagle. 
71 S. 1364, 104th Cong. {1995), at 7. 
72 ld. at 39. 
73 Id. at 79. 
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This portion of the Kempthome bill contains language which 
represents the core of the risk reduction issue without necessarily 
providing the answer, at least not directly: "to the extent that the 
benefits of the conservation measures justify the human and eco· 
nomic cost of implementation. "74 Just how much benefit justifies 
how much cost? As the "benefits" are reduction in the risk of 
the possibility of extinction for a species, what coin of the realm 
should be used to measure the benefits? Even assuming science 
could quantify the benefits of a conservation plan to species-
perhaps a ten-fold reduction of risk of extinction-it would be 
difficult to balance this against the economic impact of that same 
plan. At the extreme, one can use common sense to make a 
judgment. A recovery program which requires the diversion of a 
stream at a cost of $15 million dollars, which will aid the survival 
of 1% of a species, can be judged as providing insufficient benefit 
to justify the cost. In another case, a modification of the location 
of a development for the saving of 40% of species, when done in 
the planning stage, would clearly be justified. However, in many, 
if not most, situations the facts are not so clear and the judgment 
is more difficult. To some individuals, one more eagle is not 
worth the cost of a good meal, but to others it is priceless. Does 
the term "benefit" include benefits to humans and other species? 
As the Kempthome bill did not ultimately pass into law, a more 
detailed analysis is not necessary; however, it does underscore 
the heart of the issue of risk reduction. 
CONCLUSION 
Judgment about the appropriateness of the balance struck 
by the ESA in its present form is necessarily a subjective one. It 
is a judgment that can only be made within the context of the 
conflicts which exist within any particular country. A different 
matrix of risk issues might result in a different balance point. 
Within the United States, conflicts with wildlife do not have a 
strong component of risk to human safety. Neither does habitat 
preservation interfere with the human need to collect the fuel 
and water necessary for individual surviva1.75 Nor are wildlife 
critical to supplying the caloric needs of the vast majority of the 
74 ld. at 39. 
75 See Victor M. Marroquin-Merino, Wildlife Utilization: A New Interna· 
tional Mechanism for the Protection of Biological Diversity, 26 LAW & PoL'Y 
lNT'L Bus. 303, 319 (1995). 
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U.S. population. If these factors were present in the United 
SJates, then short term human need might dictate a different bal-
ance point. 
Judgments about laws such as the ESA must also be made in 
the context of the risk of implementation that exists within a par-
ticular society. Where the risks of implementation are high, the 
public policy risk may need to be more protective toward species 
in order to assure that the net result, protection provided to spe-
cies, is sufficiently positive. While the U.S. has some implemen-
tation risks, these risks are modest in relation to those faced in 
other legal cultures. There does not appear to be any reason to 
change the ESA to take this point into account. 
The wisdom of the present ESA can only be judged after 
there is reaffirmation as to key premises. Three premises that 
this author believes continue to be absolutely necessary if we as a 
society are serious about species protection are: (1) preservation 
of species should occur at the ecological level, (2) habitat must be 
protected, and (3) there should be an affirmative duty upon the 
government to seek the recovery of a species. 
The primary species conflict in the United States is the ten-
sion between habitat preservation and economic development of 
private lands. This conflict was not addressed by Congress when 
the ESA was adopted. The definition of "harm" was e::dended to 
cover habitat modification of private land only by subsequent 
regulation. Therefore, it is fair and appropriate that this issue 
now be fully discussed in a public, legislative debate. As this rule 
has been in effect for several decades, factual information should 
be available to decide what level of interference the present law 
and regulation has imposed upon individuals, and the benefits 
the protected species have received in return. 
If some modification of the rules is appropriate, the political 
compromise process of the United States is fully capable of han-
dling this issue. However, using the Kempthome bill or any 
equivalent as a starting point is not a fruitful path to pursue. The 
Kempthome bill represents such a radical and unjustified change 
in the policy risk and implementation risk of the ESA that it 
could not be a useful platform for change. The best approach is 
to start with a clean sheet of paper and write at the top, "Under 
what circumstances may the provisions of the ESA limit the eco-
nomic development of private land owners who may or may not 
need federal permits for changing the use of their land?" The 
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answers to this question can readily be transformed into amenda-
tory language of the ESA. With only a few such modifications, 
the venerable and wisely balanced ESA will be ready for another 
twenty-five years. 
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